Held: The class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context.

(a) There is a crucial difference between the government exercising “the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,” and acting “as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896. Thus, in the public employment context, the Court has recognized that government has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than in bringing its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 721–722. The relevant precedent establishes two main principles: First, government employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they go to work, but those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context. See, e.g., id., at 721. Second, in striking the appropriate balance, the Court considers whether the claimed employee right implicates the relevant constitutional provision’s basic concerns, or whether the right can more readily give way to the requirements of the government as employer. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138.

(b) The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that “affect some groups of citizens differently than others.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425. Olech did recognize that a class-of-one equal protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained. Its recognition of that theory, however, was not so much a departure from the principle that the Equal Protection Clause is concerned with arbitrary government classification, as it was an application of that principle to the facts in that case: The government singled Olech out with regard to its regulation of property, and the cases upon which the Court relied concerned property assessment and taxation schemes that were applied in a singular way to particular citizens. What seems to have been significant in Olech and the cited cases was the existence of a clear standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed. This differential treatment raised a concern of arbitrary classification, and therefore required that the State provide a rational basis for it. There are some forms of state action, however, which by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted to governmental officials. This principle applies most clearly in the employment context, where decisions are often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify. Unlike the context of arm’s length regulation, such as in Olech, treating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the employment context is par for the course. It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective and individualized decision that it was subjective and individualized. That the Court has never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in this area is not surprising, given the historical understanding of the at-will nature of government employment. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896. Recognition of a claim that the State treated an employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all, is simply contrary to the at-will concept. The Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine. Finally, the Court is guided, as in the past, by the “common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.” Connick, supra, at 143. If class-of-one claims were recognized in the employment context, any personnel action in which a wronged employee can conjure up a claim of differential treatment would suddenly become the basis for a federal constitutional claim. The Equal Protection Clause does not require “[t]his displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 423.

478 F. 3d 985 [9th Cir 02/08/2007], affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.

Case below: Engquist v. Oregon Dept of Agriculture (9th Cir 02/08/2007) (2-1 vote) 
Official docket sheet 
Certiorari granted 01/10/2008.  
Oral argument:  April 21, 2008.    [Transcript] [The Solicitor General participates in oral argument as amicus curiae on behalf of Respondents.] 

Question presented:  

The Ninth Circuit below vacated the jury’s verdict in favor of Petitioner Engquist and created a divisive split with the seven Circuits that apply the "rational basis" analysis to public employees who claim their termination was a result of unequal treatment, even if that treatment did not result from the employee’s membership in a suspect class. The first question presented is: 

1. Whether traditional equal protection "rational basis" analysis under Village of Willowbrook v Olech, 528 US 562, 120 S Ct 1073, 145 L Ed 2d 1060 (2000) applies to public employers who intentionally treat similarly situated employees differently with no rational bases for arbitrary, vindictive or malicious reasons? 

[The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari as to a second 
question presented in the petition for certiorari.] 

Certiorari Documents: 

• Petition for certiorari 
• Brief in opposition 
• Reply 

• For Petitioner Anup Engquist: Neal Katyal; 600 New Jersey Ave., N.W.; Washington, DC  20001; (202) 662-9000 - and - David H. Remes; Covington & Burling LLP; 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., NW; Washington, DC  20004; (202) 662-5212.  
• For Respondent Oregon Department of Agriculture: Mary H. Williams; Solicitor General, Oregon Department of Justice; 1162 Court Street, NE; Salem, OR  97301-4096; mary.williams@doj.state.or.us; (503) 378-4402.